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Renewable energy certificates (RECs) are tradable instruments that convey the attributes 
of a renewable energy generator and the right to make certain claims about energy 
purchases.  RECs first appeared in US markets in the late 1990s and are particularly 
important in states that accept or require them as evidence of compliance with renewables 
portfolio standards (RPS). The emergence of RECs as a tradable commodity has made 
utilities, generators, and regulators increasingly aware of the need to specify who owns 
the RECs in energy transactions.   
 
In voluntary transactions, most agree that the question of REC ownership can and should 
be negotiated privately between the buyer and the seller, and should be clearly 
established by contract.  Claims about purchasing or using renewable energy should only 
be made if REC ownership can be documented.   
 
In many other cases, however, renewable energy transactions are either mandated or 
encouraged through state or federal policy.  Because of the recent appearance of RECs, 
legislation and regulation mandating the purchase of renewable energy has sometimes 
been silent on the disposition of the RECs associated with that generation.  Furthermore, 
some renewable energy contracts pre-date the existence of RECs, and therefore do not 
address REC ownership.  In both of these instances, the issue of REC ownership must 
often be answered by legislative or regulatory authorities.  The resulting uncertainty in 
REC ownership has hindered the development of robust REC markets and has, in some 
cases, led to contention between buyers and sellers of renewable generation.   
 
This article, which is based on a longer Berkeley Lab report,1 reviews federal and state 
efforts to clarify the ownership of RECs from Qualifying Facilities (QFs) that sell their 
generation under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) of 1978. The full 
report also addresses state efforts to clarify REC ownership in two other situations, 
customer-owned generation that benefits from state net metering rules, and generation 
facilities that receive financial incentives from state or utility funds.  
 
The issue of REC ownership most often arises in states that have adopted an RPS. In such 
states, both parties to QF contracts have a lot at stake: either additional cost to a utility if 
RECs are awarded to the QF, or loss of value to the QF if RECs are awarded to the 
                                                 
1 The full report, “Who Owns Renewable Energy Certificates: An Exploration of Policy Options and 
Practice,” may be found at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/EMS/re-pubs.html.  
utility. As a rough estimate, QF RECs that are eligible for state RPS programs could have 
a value between $35 million and $175 million,2 so there is significant economic value 
riding on the ownership question. 
 
FERC Decides…Or Does It? 
 
In 2003, uncertainty about who owns the RECs in mandated QF contracts with utilities 
led to a petition to FERC to issue a declaratory judgment on the question as it relates to 
Section 210 of PURPA. FERC declared that avoided cost payments mandated by PURPA 
pay only for energy and capacity and do not convey the renewable attributes, absent 
explicit contractual language to the contrary. FERC stated that PURPA does not address 
the ownership of RECs and that “ the Commission’s avoided cost regulations did not 
contemplate the existence of RECs.” But FERC also declared that RECs are the creation 
of states and that states may decide the question, but that the decision must be based on 
state law, not on PURPA.3
 
In denying a rehearing, FERC emphasized that avoided cost rates do not compensate for 
more than energy and capacity. It reached this conclusion in part because energy from 
fossil-fuel fired cogeneration is priced the same as energy from a renewable small power 
production facility. If avoided cost rates do not compensate a QF from more than energy 
and capacity, FERC reasoned, “it follows that other attributes associated with the 
facilities are separate from, and may be sold separately from, the capacity and energy.” 
 
In a footnote to this statement, FERC noted that  
 
“…cogeneration facilities, to receive QF status, are required to produce both 
electricity and useful thermal output…The thermal output that is a pre-requisite to a 
cogeneration facility’s achieving QF status is saleable separately from the capacity 
and energy of the cogeneration facility…If the thermal output of a cogeneration QF is 
separately saleable, the renewable attributes of a small power production QF are 
similarly separate.”  
 
Qualifying Facilities were initially pleased with the FERC Order because they interpreted 
it to mean that utilities must pay separately, in addition to avoided costs, for the RECs. 
The FERC Order, however, left QF contracts in an unsettled state by simultaneously 
finding that states are the appropriate venue in which to determine REC ownership, as 
long as states do not base their decisions on PURPA avoided cost payments. As a result, 
the focus has shifted to the states, with the contenders on both sides of the issue often 
citing the FERC Order to bolster their cases.  
                                                 
2 According to the US EIA, in 1996, renewable QFs produced 68,594,000 MWh, and that number has been 
rising. The value estimate assumes that only half of them are eligible for RPS programs, and that they are 
worth from $1 to $5 per REC, a conservative assumption. 
3 See FERC Docket No. EL03-133-000, Petition for Declaratory Order and Request for Expedited 
Consideration, American Ref-Fuel Company, Covanta Energy Group, Montenay Power Corporation, and 
Wheelabrator Technologies, Inc. June 16, 2003; Order Granting Petition for Declaratory Ruling, October 
1, 2003.  American Ref-Fuel Co. et al., 105 FERC ¶ 61,004 (2003); and Order Denying Rehearing. April 
15, 2004. 107 FERC ¶ 61,016 (2004). 
 
The Argument Moves to the States 
 
Sixteen states have addressed REC ownership in QF or other existing contracts, either 
explicitly or implicitly. In all but one case (New Mexico) the determination of QF REC 
ownership has been made by state regulation, as opposed to legislation, though in many 
instances these determinations have been informed by legislative guidance. We examined 
the record in seven states where the issue has been debated extensively among parties and 
where the record is readily available.  
 
A wide variety of arguments have been presented on both sides of the issue. We 
summarize some of the major arguments and counter-arguments below in order to convey 
the nature of the debate that is occurring and the issues on which state regulators are 
deciding.    
 
One of the threshold issues in the debate (despite the FERC ruling) is whether PURPA 
itself requires that RECs be transferred to the utility purchasers, through its qualification 
requirements.  Utilities, for example, have argued that the renewable attributes are 
inextricably tied to QF sales of energy. The fact that a facility is renewable is what 
obligates a utility to purchase its power under PURPA.  A utility would not be obligated 
to enter into a contract absent the facility’s status as a “small renewable power project.” 
Therefore ownership of the RECs must remain with the utility if its customers are to 
receive full value for the cost of this resource. 
 
QFs counter that the PURPA requirement to purchase electricity from renewable QFs 
does not mean that contracts must convey the RECs to the utilities. Being renewable is 
merely a qualifying characteristic that makes a generating facility eligible for a contract, 
and does not require transfer of the attributes. The FERC Order supports this distinction 
and affirms that RECs are not automatically transferred to the purchasing utility. 
 
Related debate also centers on compensation for RECs. Utilities generally argue that 
under state law, payments are intended to compensate the QF for the entire output of the 
facility, including its non-power characteristics. In fact, in some states, QFs submit 
affidavits to the purchasing utilities attesting that the power sold is renewable energy. 
This, the utilities argue, proves that they are being sold the renewable attributes.  
 
QFs respond that the FERC Order states that avoided costs are not intended to 
compensate the QF for more than energy and capacity. Further, they say that it is clear 
that avoided cost payments do not compensate for RECs because renewable QFs are paid 
the same avoided costs as are fossil-fueled cogeneration QFs. Therefore avoided cost 
payments by utilities compensate only for energy and capacity, and not for environmental 
benefits. QFs in some states have also argued that state calculations of avoided cost are 
currently based on costs associated with fossil fuel-fired plants that do not have 
associated RECs. They conclude, therefore, that avoided cost compensation does not 
include any recognition of the economic value of the RECs. 
 
In Colorado, QFs argued that when a contract does not expressly convey RECs, those 
severable property interests are reserved for the seller. They say that a utility can only be 
entitled to those products specifically enumerated in a contract. 
 
The utility argued the opposite, that when an asset or commodity is not specifically 
reserved for the seller, the full asset or commodity is deemed to have been transferred to 
the buyer. 
 
Some of the compensation arguments focus on the question of fairness. Utilities say that 
renewable QFs are already fairly compensated based on a stream of guaranteed 
payments, which QF owners presumably judge to be sufficient to earn a return on their 
investment. 
 
QFs respond that payments are not related to QF economic needs, but depend solely on 
the utility’s avoided cost for energy and capacity. 
 
Utilities also argue that they and their ratepayers are already paying above-market prices 
for QF contracts and therefore customers should receive all the benefits of this energy. 
 
QFs answer that although many QF contracts have turned out to be expensive relative to 
market prices, the absolute price payable under a QF agreement is not relevant to 
determining the parties’ intent with regard to REC transfer. They say that a contract 
cannot be interpreted in light of subsequent changes in market prices. They conclude that 
QFs must be paid the avoided cost in effect when the agreement was made. 
 
Utilities argue that requiring them to pay extra for RECs would be a windfall gain to QFs 
that were satisfied with contract terms entered into long ago without the promise of 
supplementary remuneration in the future. 
 
In reply, QFs maintain that requiring QFs to transfer RECs with energy without 
additional compensation would provide a windfall to utilities that were satisfied with 
contract terms entered into long ago without the promise of supplementary values in the 
future. 
 
QFs also argue that awarding RECs to utilities in exchange for their originally contracted 
purchase price is tantamount to a reduction in price after the agreements were made. 
They maintain that purchase prices agreed to at the time of the PURPA contract cannot 
be revisited by state commissions. 
 
Utilities counter that there is no change in price because nothing different is being 
conveyed than before RECs were invented. 
 
On another issue, QFs maintain that regulatory assignment of RECs to the utilities 
without just compensation would constitute an unconstitutional taking of private property 
in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution, and would 
obligate the state to compensate the QFs for the value of RECs.  
 
Utilities and others argue that there is no entitlement to compensation for RECs because 
(1) there is no reasonable expectation of protection, for example, a statute conferring 
property rights in RECs; (2) the restriction on RECs does not deprive the QF of all 
economic value attached to its property; and (3) restrictions on property may be allowed 
as long as they promote the general welfare.  They say that the fact that a property 
interest cannot be fully exploited is not sufficient to turn government restrictions into a 
compensable taking. 
 
The effect of unbundling RECs from the sale of energy also sparks opposing viewpoints. 
QFs argue that RECs are not mentioned in the contracts as being transferred. Electric 
energy sales do not transfer products that are unbundled from the energy and capacity 
sold. 
 
Utilities maintain that even though RECs were not contemplated at the time the QF 
contracts were signed, the QF transactions were, in effect, a bundled sale of energy and 
attributes that at the time represented a single product. 
 
QFs state that RECs are a new product that must be contracted for and sold pursuant to its 
own terms separately from the energy and capacity. 
 
Utilities disagree, reasoning that RECs were being conveyed with PURPA contracts even 
before they were recognized and valued. Just because an attribute subsequently acquires a 
separate market value does not mean that it now warrants separate compensation 
 
QFs also contend that state RPS programs and regional REC tracking systems provide for 
the creation of unbundled certificates. If RECs are unbundled commodities, they 
maintain, it cannot be argued that they are automatically transferred with the sale of 
power as an inseparable part of the QF output. 
 
Utilities dispute this interpretation, arguing that the adoption of a system that allows for 
unbundling does not transform the essential nature of a QF contract as a bundled 
transaction into one that includes only the commodity. 
 
Some of the arguments relate to the balancing of risks and rewards. As utilities see it, by 
accepting a QF contract, the generator avoids the risk of market forces and is entitled to a 
long-term, assured revenue stream, while the utility is guaranteed cost-recovery by the 
regulatory commission. They contend that the energy market risk is shifted to the utility 
and its ratepayers. By now asserting ownership of the RECs, the utilities think, the QF 
seeks to retain the benefits of PURPA protection but gain the benefits of market 
participation through the separate sale of RECs. 
 
Naturally, QFs see things differently. In their view, if utilities are granted ownership of 
all renewable attributes (RECs), they should also be responsible for the environmental 
attributes and liabilities of non-renewable power plants from which they purchase but do 
not own—contingencies that are not recognized on the utilities’ books. QFs reason that a 
utility should not be able to pick and choose which attributes it would like to own among 
all the purchased energy for which it contracts. 
 
The presence of an RPS, which drives many of these debates, also leads to some different 
arguments. For example, utilities believe that for RPS compliance they should be deemed 
to have purchased the attributes of the power from the QFs and should be able to count 
the RECs towards meeting the RPS. They state that granting the RECs to the utility 
would reduce RPS compliance costs borne by ratepayers. 
 
QFs rejoin that payment for RECs may be critical to a project’s economic feasibility. In 
their view, the sale of RECs separate from power is intended to compensate the owner of 
the renewable facility and promote further investment in renewable resources. Because 
the risks of development and operation of a renewable facility are borne by the QF 
owner, the rewards associated with RECs should also accrue to the QF. 
 
Utilities also argue that in states with an RPS, awarding the RECs to the QFs would result 
in the utilities having to pay the QFs twice – once for energy and capacity based on 
avoided cost, and a second time for RECs – for no additional benefit to ratepayers. 
 
QFs respond that utilities and ratepayers receive the benefits of renewable energy even 
without the RECs: increased fuel diversity, a local and secure fuel supply, increased 
efficiency of energy production, and a fixed price not subject to the vagaries of world 
commodity markets.    
 
Utilities claim that RPS laws are intended to encourage the construction of new 
renewable resources, and not to pay more for RECs from existing renewable resources 
that already sell their output to the utility. 
 
The QF perspective is that RPS laws intend that the requirement be met in the most cost-
effective manner, which includes purchasing RECs associated with any given contract, 
whether from a new generator or an existing QF. 
 
Not every argument is made in every state, of course, because each state has a different 
legal context. However, it is noticeable that some arguments are picked up and refined in 
states that subsequently open a proceeding on REC ownership. Clearly, both sides are 
trying to learn from prior proceedings and pick the most convincing and persuasive 
points. 
 
States Decide 
 
It is readily apparent that there is no conciliating most of these arguments. State 
regulatory commissions have had to weigh these arguments in light of state law, rules and 
precedent. 
 
Table 1 summarizes state determinations so far on the ownership of RECs within the 
context of QF generation and PURPA.  Treatment of REC ownership varies significantly 
based on whether the QF contract pre-dates a specific regulatory determination or 
whether the regulation applies to new QF contracts (or at least post-dates a regulatory 
determination). The older pre-existing contracts are generally silent on the issue of 
ownership and therefore present a greater challenge, but without guidance, buyers and 
sellers may be stalemated in negotiation of new contracts as well.   
 
In most cases, states have opted to establish that the utility purchaser will have title to the 
underlying RECs for existing QF contracts, while several states award RECs resulting 
from new contracts to the QF. Such determinations are especially common in states with 
RPS mandates where existing renewable generation is eligible.  In these instances, state 
policymakers are apparently concerned that conveyance of RECs to existing QF 
generators would unnecessarily raise the cost of the RPS policy. Though a large number 
of states have ruled on the issue of QF REC ownership, some of these rulings have been 
appealed in state and federal courts, and some uncertainty therefore remains.4  
 
Table 1. State Positions on REC Ownership under PURPA QF Contracts 
RECs Conveyed to Power 
Purchaser 
Proceeding in Process 
(←leaning→) 
RECs Retained by QF Unless 
Otherwise Stated in Contract 
CT (existing) AZ→ CO (new) 
CO (existing) ←CA (existing)* NV (new) 
ME (existing)* PA OR (new) 
MN (existing)**  RI (new) 
TX (new) ND (existing and new, with 
compensation) 
 
UT (new) 
NJ (existing)   
NM (existing and new)   
NV (existing)   
TX (existing)   
WI (existing)**   
*   Maine and California currently count PURPA QF contracts towards RPS, without specifically requiring 
RECs to be transferred to the buyer. 
** Renewable attributes appear to be conveyed with underlying energy deliveries, by default, for purpose 
of compliance with state RPS requirements, but treatment of RECs is not stated clearly.   
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Given FERC’s 2003 ruling, and the fact that more and more states have adopted policies 
in which RECs are recognized, if not required, for RPS compliance, pressure has been 
mounting on the states to address the question of REC ownership. This is critical for QF 
contracts because RECs from these facilities are material to compliance with state 
                                                 
4 Appeals of state regulatory decisions to state or federal courts are pending in Connecticut, New Jersey and 
Colorado. 
 
renewable portfolio standards, or may otherwise be sold in voluntary markets.  The 
quantity of RECs from QFs, and potentially their value, is significant. 
 
On a longer-term basis, issues of REC ownership may diminish.  New QF contracts are 
more likely than older contracts to clearly specify REC disposition. The number of QF 
contracts is also likely to diminish with the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005. 
EPAct 2005 does not affect existing QF contracts, but prospectively, FERC may end the 
utility purchase obligation on a regional basis if it finds that a wholesale electricity 
market is competitive, affording generators non-discriminatory access to sell their power. 
In time this will result in less tension and conflict.  
 
In the meantime, state policymakers will play a critical role in ownership determinations, 
and some degree of confusion and uncertainty will likely remain.  Most of the 
determinations have thus far occurred through state regulatory action. Absent further 
clarification from FERC on the issue of QF REC ownership, however, in the future states 
may wish to determine REC ownership through state legislation.  Though regulatory 
action has been the more common approach to date, those decisions have sometimes been 
appealed to the courts.  State legislative action may reduce such appeals.  
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